Abstract. We introduce a new approach for cryptanalysis of key agreement protocols based on noncommutative groups. This approach uses functions that estimate the distance of a group element to a given subgroup. We test it against the Shpilrain-Ushakov protocol, which is based on Thompson's group F , and show that it can break about half the keys within a few seconds on a single PC.
Introduction
Key agreement protocols have been the subject of extensive studies in the past 30 years. Their main task is to allow two parties (in the sequel, Alice and Bob) to agree on a common secret key over an insecure communication channel. The best known example of such a protocol is the Diffie-Hellman protocol, which uses a (commutative) cyclic group. Over the last few years, there was a lot of interest in key agreement protocols based on noncommutative groups, and much research was dedicated to analyzing these proposals and suggesting alternative ones (see, e.g., [1, [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [10] [11] [12] , and references therein).
A possible approach for attacking such systems is the length-based cryptanalysis, which was outlined in [6] . This approach relies on the existence of a good length function on the underlying group, i.e., a function ℓ(g) that tends to grow as the number of generators multiplied to obtain g grows. Examples of groups known to have such length functions are the braid group B N [2] and Thompson's group F [3] . For these groups, several practical realizations of length-based attacks were demonstrated [4, 5, ?] . These attacks can achieve good success rates, but usually only when we allow the algorithm to explore many suboptimal partial solutions, which greatly increases both the time and space complexities (see [5] for more details).
Breaking the protocol
The goal of the adversary is to obtain the secret group element K from the publicly known elements u 1 , u 2 and z. For this it suffices to solve the following problem:
Definition 1 (Decomposition problem) Given z ∈ G and u = azb where a ∈ A and b ∈ B, find some elementsã ∈ A andb ∈ B, such that azb = azb.
Indeed, assume that the attacker, given u 1 = a 1 zb 1 , findsã 1 ∈ A and b 1 ∈ B, such thatã 1 zb 1 = a 1 zb 1 . Then, because u 2 = b 2 za 2 is known, the attacker can computẽ
Alternatively, the attacker can break the protocol by finding a valid decomposition of u 2 = b 2 za 2 .
For any givenã ∈ A we can compute its complementb = z −1ã−1 u = z −1ã−1 (azb), which guarantees thatãzb = azb. The pairã,b is a solution to this problem if, and only if,b ∈ B. A similar comment applies if we start withb ∈ B. This involves being able to solve the group membership problem, i.e., to determine whetherb ∈ B (orã ∈ A in the second case).
It should be stressed that solving the decomposition problem is sufficient, but not necessary in order to cryptanalyze the system. All that is required in practice is finding some pairã,b that succeeds in decrypting the information passed between Alice and Bob. Any pairã ∈ A andb ∈ B will work, but there can be other pairs, which are just as good. This observation can be useful in cases where the group membership problem is difficult or in groups where the centralizers of individual elements are considerably larger than the centralizers of the subgroups (which is not the case in F , see [9] ). For simplicity, in the sequel we will restrict ourselves to solutions whereã ∈ A andb ∈ B.
Subgroup distance functions
if it satisfies the following two axioms:
It is an invariant subgroup distance function if it also satisfies:
Clearly, if it is possible to evaluate a subgroup distance function d H on all elements of G, then the membership decision problem for H is solvable: g ∈ H ⇐⇒ d H (g) = 0. Conversely, if one can solve the membership decision problem, a trivial distance function can be derived from it, e.g., d H (g) = 1 − χ H (g), where χ H is the characteristic function of H.
Obviously, this trivial distance function is not a good example. For the subgroup distance function to be useful, it has to somehow measure how close a given element g is to H, that is, if d H (g 1 ) < d H (g 2 ), then g 1 is closer to H than g 2 . This concept of "closeness" can be hard to define, and even harder to evaluate. The notion of what's considered a good distance function may vary, depending on the subgroups and on the presentation. In the sequel we will discuss concrete examples of subgroup distance function in Thompson's group F .
Assuming the existence of such functions, consider the following algorithm for solving the decomposition problem:
We are given words z, xzy ∈ G, where x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , X, Y are commuting subgroups of G and S X , S Y are their respective (finite) generating sets. The goal it to find somex ∈ X andỹ ∈ Y , such that xzy =xzỹ. The algorithm runs at most a predefined number of iterations N . Otherwise, letx ← x j and return to step 2.
Observe that if the algorithm halts in step 2, then the pairx,ỹ is a solution of the decomposition problem.
Algorithm 1 is very similar to the length-based attacks described in [4, ?] . The difference is that it uses the subgroup distance function, instead of the length function to evaluate the quality of candidates. As such, any extensions applicable to the length-based algorithms (such as memory, lookahead, etc.) can be used with the distance-based attack as well. Refer to [5, ?] for more information.
Attacking the Shpilrain-Ushakov protocol
The adversary is given the common word z and the public elements u 1 , u 2 . These can be translated into four equations in the group: 
Thompson's group
Thompson's group F is the infinite noncommutative group defined by the following generators and relations:
Remark 1 From Equation (2) it's evident that the elements x 0 , x 1 and their inverses generate the entire group, because
is a negative letter. A word in F is a sequence of letters. We define |w| as the length of the word w , i.e., the number of letters in it.
Definition 4 A word w ∈ F is said to be in normal form, if
and the following two conditions hold:
A word is said to be in seminormal form if only (NF1) holds.
While a seminormal form is not necessarily unique, a normal form is, i.e., two words represent the same group element if and only if they have the same normal form [3] . The following rewriting rules can be used to convert any word to its seminormal form [12] :
For all non-negative integers i < k:
For all non-negative integers i:
The seminormal form can be subsequently converted to a normal form by searching for pairs of indices violating (NF2), starting from the boundary between the positive and negative parts, and applying the inverses of rewriting rules (R1) and (R4) to eliminate these pairs [12] :
Suppose that (x ia , x
) is a pair of letters violating (NF2) and that a and b are maximal with this property (i.e., there exists no violating pair (x i k , x −1 j l ) with k > a and l > b). Then i a = j b and all indices in
are higher than i a + 1 (by definition of (NF2)). Applying the inverse of (R1) to x ia and the inverse of (R4) to x −1 j b we get:
The violating pair (x ia , x
) is cancelled and the subword c ′ obtained from c by index shifting contains no violating pairs (by the assumption of maximality on (a, b)). Thus, we can continue searching for bad pairs, starting from a − 1 and b − 1 down. Thus we are guaranteed to find and remove all the violating pairs and reach the normal form.
Definition 5 (Normal form length) For w ∈ F , whose normal form isŵ, define the normal form length as ℓ NF (w) = |ŵ|.
The following lemma shows the effect multiplication by a single letter has on the normal form of the word. This result will be useful in the following sections.
Lemma 1 Let w ∈ F and x = x ±1 t be a basic generator of F in the presentation (2) . Then ℓ NF (xw) = ℓ NF (w) ± 1 (and due to symmetry, ℓ NF (wx) = ℓ NF (w) ± 1).
Proof. We'll concentrate on the product xw (obviously, the case of wx is similar) and observe what happens to the normal form of w when it's multiplied on the left by the letter x. Without loss of generality
is in normal form. Denote the positive and negative parts of w by w p and w n respectively.
Assume that x = x t is a positive letter. Then bw is converted to a seminormal form by moving x into its proper location, while updating its index, using repeated applications of (R1). Assuming m applications of (R1) are necessary, the result is of the form:
Remark 2 Observe that it is not possible that
i m = t + m − 1, because in order to apply (R1): x t+m−1 x im → x im x t+m , one must have i m < t+m−1. Example 1 w = x 3 x 7 x 11 x −1 9 x −1 4 , b = x 8 . bw = x 8 · x 3 x 7 x 11 x −1 9 x −1 4 is converted to bw = x 3 x 7 x 10 x 11 x −1 9 x −1
, by 2 applications of (R1).
Obviously, bw is a seminormal form and |bw| = |w| + 1.
If bw is in normal form (as in the above example), we're done. The only situation where it's not in normal form, is if it contains pairs violating (NF2).
Since x t+m is the only letter introduced, the only violating pair can be
The inverse of (R1) is applied to rewrite x 9 x 11 → x 10 x 9 , and
Whenever a situation occurs as described above, the pair (x t+m , x −1 t+m ) is cancelled, according to the procedure described in Section 4. This causes all indices above t + m to be decreased by 1. The resulting word is (1) After m applications of (R2) the resulting word is
, where i m+1 = t + m, and so the pair is cancelled by applying (R5). Now, because i m < t + m − 1, the elimination of the pair (x t+m , x −1 t+m ) does not introduce pairs that violate (NF2), and so bw is in normal form and has |bw| = |w| − 1.
9 and the pair of inverses is cancelled out to obtain x −1
is moved to its proper place among the negative letters, updating its index if necessary. This is completed through m applications of (R2), followed by k −m applications of (R3) and finally, l −n applications of (R4), to obtain
, where i m < t+m−1, i m+1 > t+m, j n+1 > t+m and j n ≤ t+m. Because the letter x t+m is not present in bw (otherwise the previously described situation would occur), the newly introduced letter x −1 t+m cannot violate (NF2), and therefore bw is in fact in normal form and |bw| = |w| + 1.
4 is rewritten as: x All of the following facts are shown in [12] : A s is exactly the set of elements whose normal form is
Key generation Let s ≥ 2 and L be positive integers. The words a 1 , a 2 ∈ A s , b 1 , b 2 ∈ B s , and w ∈ F are all chosen of normal form length L, as follows: Let X be A, B, or W . Start with the empty word, and multiply it on the right by a generator (or inverse) selected uniformly at random from the set S X . Continue this procedure until the normal form of the word has length L.
For practical and (hopefully) secure implementation of the protocol, it is suggested in [12] to use s ∈ {3, 4, . . . , 8} and L ∈ {256, 258, . . . , 320}.
Subgroup distance functions in Thompson's group
In this section we'll suggest several natural distance functions from the subgroups A s , B s ≤ F defined in Section 4.1. These distance functions can be used to implement the attack outlined by Algorithm 1.
Distance functions from B s
For w ∈ F define P i (w) and N i (w) as the number of occurrences of x i and x 
when pairs of elements are rewritten, the lower-indexed element is not affected, so any letters with indices ≤ s will not be affected by moving b. Finally, if b is cancelled out due to violating (NF2), the process again only affects letters with indices higher than b's (see the proof of Lemma 1). In all cases, the generators with indices ≤ s
are not affected at all, and so d Bs (bw) = d Bs (w).
⊓ ⊔
One can intuitively feel that d Bs is a natural distance function, because it counts the number of "bad" letters in w (letters that do not belong to the subgroup B s ). Indeed, if w is in normal form, w = w p w c w n , where w p and w n are the "bad" positive and negative subwords, respectively, then d Bs (w) = |w p | + |w n | and w −1 p ww −1 n ∈ B. We now introduce another natural function that measures distance from B s .
Definition 7 (Weighted distance from B s ) Let s ≤ 2 be an integer. For w ∈ F the weighted distance from B s is defined as
d Bs does not only count the "bad" letters, but assigns a score for each letter, depending on how far below s + 1 it is (in particular, d Bs (w) ≤ d Bs (w) for all w ∈ F . The following claim is straightforward.
Claim 3 d Bs is an invariant distance function.
Proof. The proof of Claim 2 shows that multiplication by b does not alter any letters below s + 1 in w. Therefore, the weight of each such letter is also preserved. ⊓ ⊔
Distance functions from A s
We will now describe a number of natural distance functions from the subgroup A s . Recall (Section 4.1) that A s is the set of all elements in F , whose normal form is of the type
, i.e, has positive and negative parts of the same length m, and additionally satisfies i k −k < s and j k − k < s for every k = 1, . . . , m.
Definition 8 (Distance from
is the number of "bad" letters inŵ, i.e., letters that violate the A s property, plus the difference between the lengths of the positive or negative parts. d As is clearly a distance function. However, it is not invariant, as shown by the following example:
Similarly we can define a weighted distance function from A s , which not only counts the number of bad letters, but gives a score to each such letter, based on the difference i k − k (or j k − k).
Definition 9 (Weighted distance from
As adds a positive integer. As such, it's a distance function, which is again not invariant (the example above works here too).
A somewhat different approach to defining distance from A s arises from the observation that the number of bad letters can be less important than the maximum value of the differences i k − k and j k − k across the word, which measures the size of the violation. The difference between the two distance functions roughly corresponds to the difference between the L 1 and L ∞ norms.
. Suppose that for some integer k we have i k − k − s + 1 = m p > 0 and that m p is the maximum for all i k . ). This observation suggests the following distance function:
n}) .
The maximum-based distance from A s is defined as
For every w ∈ A s m p , m n and |p − n| are 0 by definition, while for every w ∈ A s at least one of them has to be positive, so the d m As is a distance function. It turns out that, unlike the two previously defined distance functions, d m As is also invariant. (
t+m is cancelled out with x i m+1 after m applications of (R2). It follows that p ′ = p, n ′ = n and m ′ n = m n (because the negative letters are unaffected). Observe also that there can be no bad letters among the first m: indeed, (R2) is applied m times, for each k = 1 . . . m rewriting x 
. Here p ′ = p + 1 and n ′ = n + 1. 
and so if m n increases, |(p + m p ) − (n + m n )| decreases by the same amount, and overall d m As (w ′ ) = d m As (w). 0 and x t are cancelled out: Assuming x t is cancelled out (due to violation of (NF2)) with x 0 is not cancelled out, but x t is: To test the applicability of the subgroup distance functions to cryptanalysis, we tested Algorithm 1 against the Shpilrain-Ushakov protocol in the settings of Thompson's group. Initially, each of the five distance functions presented in the previous section was tested separately: we generated a public element azb and tried to recover a single private element a or b from it. For the recovery of a, the functions d Bs and d Bs were used to assess the quality of the complements. Similarly, for the recovery of b, we tried d As , d As and d m As . For each distance function, the experiment was run at least 1000 times, each time with new, randomly generated keys, with the minimum recommended parameters of s = 3, L = 256. The bound N = 2L was chosen on the number of iterations, since preliminary experiments have shown that the success rates do not increase beyond that. The results are summarized in Table 1 . It can be seen that the distance functions d Bs and d m As noticeably outperform the other distance functions, in recovering a and b, respectively. The fact that d m As clearly outperforms its counterparts suggests that the notion of invariance may be useful for assessing the suitability of a given distance function. Preliminary experiments have shown that, regardless of the settings, the success probability of finding a 1 given a 1 zb 1 is similar to that of finding a 1 . Therefore, in order to estimate the overall success rate against an actual instance of the cryptosystem, it's sufficient to try to recover one of the four a's and b's. If we denote by p a and p b the probability of successfully recovering a and b, respectively, and assume that all probabilities are independent, then, the expected total success rate is roughly 1 − (1 − p a ) 2 (1 − p b ) 2 (because each instance of the protocol contains two elements of type a and two of type b).
When the success rates of the two best distance functions, d Bs for a and d m As for b, are combined, the expected overall success probability, according to the above, is between 50% and 54%, which was experimentally verified. Note that this attack is very efficient, since it involves no backtracking, no lookahead, and no analysis of suboptimal partial results: it tries to peel off the generators by a greedy algorithm, which considers only locally optimal steps. Attacking each key required only a few seconds on a single PC, and it is very surprising that such a simple attack succeeds about half the time. These results are much better than those achieved by length-based attacks of similar complexity on this cryptosystem (see [9] ). It is interesting to note that possible extensions of the attack, such as memorizing many suboptimal partial solutions or using significant lookahead (which require much higher time and space complexities) have different effects on length-based and distance-based attacks. While it was shown in [9] that these extensions greatly improve the success rates of the length-based attack, experiments with the distance-based attack, with similar values of the memory and lookahead parameters, showed almost no improvement. However, the situation may be very different for other cryptosystems and other subgroup distance functions.
To further test the performance of the distance functions, several experiments were run with different values of the parameters (s, L). We used the combination of d Bs and d m As , which was established as the best in the former experiment. Table 2 shows the overall success probability, for L ∈ {128, 256, 320, 512, 640, 960} and s ∈ {3, 5, 8}. The success rates stay remarkably consistent across different lengths for a given s, and even increasing s does not cause a significant drop. The time complexity of the attack grows linearly with s and roughly quadratically with L, with most of the time being spent on computing normal forms of elements in the group. For the largest parameters presented here, the attack still required under a minute in most cases. This suggests that for the Shpilrain-Ushakov cryptosystem the distance-based attack remains a viable threat, even when the security parameters s and L are increased beyond the original recommendations. 
Conclusion
We introduced a novel form of heuristic attacks on public key cryptosystems that are based on combinatorial group theory, using functions that estimate the distance of group elements to a given subgroup. Our results demonstrate that these distance-based attacks can achieve significantly better success rates than previously suggested length-based attacks of similar complexity, and thus they are a potential threat to any cryptosystem based on equations in a noncommutative group, which takes its elements from specific subgroups. It will be interesting to test this approach for other groups and other protocols.
